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Europe’s modern history is full of migrants and migrations: people have
criss-crossed the continent for centuries to flee war, persecution or misery,
mostly bringing benefits to their host countries and enriching their
economies, societies and cultures. Since the discovery of the Americas,
European migrants have also fled the old continent in search of a better life
and new opportunities, contributing to the building of a unique
‘multicultural’ society.1
Until 1989, the European Union experienced either internal migration2
or specific and mostly ‘controlled’ flows of economic migrants from outside,
although the latter, in particular, slowed significantly from the early
1970s. Some countries also hosted relatively small numbers of refugees and
asylum seekers.3
Since then, however, two phenomena have fundamentally altered the nature
and perception of migration in Europe: the collapse of the Soviet Empire,
and the revolution in travel and communications across the world.4
Coupled with the income gap, as magnified through the lens of worldwide
television broadcasts, these have triggered new, and at times massive, waves
of immigration into an EU where the demand for certain categories 
of workers is on the rise,5 thus gradually reopening the gates closed 
in the 1970s.
In this paper, which was conceived within the framework of the European
Policy Centre’s programme on Multicultural Europe, Elizabeth Collett
analyses the changing nature of such migrations, especially over the past
decade, and highlights the different approaches taken by the Member States
and (where applicable) the EU itself.
She rightly underlines that these new migrants are too often considered as all
being of one and the same kind, and are dealt with accordingly, whereas they
are, in fact, a mixed bunch which defies ‘one-size-fits-all’ categorisations and
policies. She argues that their diversity – in terms of background, status,
motivation and ultimate goals – must be taken into account in order to

















06 Temporary migrants, in particular, pose distinct challenges and
opportunities, and thus require tailored responses. Instead, as Elizabeth
Collett points out, current policies are still responding to an outdated vision
and perception of immigration and integration.
Furthermore, important differences exist even among temporary migrants:
seasonal workers, international students and migrants from the new Member
States of central and eastern Europe (EU-8) do not share the same expectations
and needs.
As a consequence, she concludes, national integration policies should phase
in dedicated provisions and entitlements in order to favour the most
appropriate degree of functional integration and participation in the host
society. In this context, the EU should act as a facilitator and a standard-setter,
mainly by establishing (and monitoring) common codes of conduct and by
supporting relatively homogeneous training and educational schemes.
This is, in many ways, the other side of the integration problem in Europe, as
distinct from – but occasionally overlapping with and complementary to – the
one analysed by Mirjam Dittrich in a separate EPC Working Paper on Muslims
in Europe published in March this year.
Antonio Missiroli is Chief Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre
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As media articles, academic papers and policy reports on the subject have
pointed out, immigration to Europe has become more copious, diverse and
complex than ever before, with migrants hailing from different cultural,
economic and social backgrounds and from all corners of the world.
They can be highly skilled or unskilled, temporary or permanent, and their
motives and intentions are equally diverse. Reflecting this, immigration policies
to manage the flow of migrants into the European Union have also become
more complex in the last decade, at both the national and supranational level.
Yet, despite government recognition that immigration and integration
policies should be developed hand in hand, there is little evidence that the
latter are being framed with as much attention to detail as the former.
This paper looks at current national and EU integration policies, and compares
existing policy parameters with the integration needs of some often-overlooked
migrant populations within Europe, such as temporary migrant workers,
international students and migrant workers from the EU-8 (the countries of
central and eastern Europe which joined the EU in May 2004).
This paper recommends that policy-makers take a more nuanced approach
to integration, developing policies tailored to address the full range of
migrant needs. It focuses on integrating newly-arrived migrants into Europe,
and on the distinction that Member States make between those who arrive
intending to settle and those who do not.
An increasing proportion of foreign nationals arriving in Europe do not
come through permanent channels and, more often than not, they are
excluded from integration strategies and introductory programmes. This
paper proposes a basic level of integration for all newcomers to ensure that
they can be self-sufficient, regardless of what type of migrant they are or
how long they intend to stay.
The bulk of integration policy development and implementation rightly
takes place at the local level. National and supranational institutions cannot

















06 educational facilities, migrant associations and other civil society
organisations at the regional and community level – in the integration
process, nor match the value they offer.
However, with integration a declared priority of The Hague Programme for
2005-10, EU policy-makers have an opportunity to improve the integration of
migrants by setting standards and guidelines for national and regional policies,
and funding capacity-building for introductory programmes and language
courses at the local level. The intention is to ensure that all non-nationals in

















06II. Migration in Europe
II. 1. Changing migration flows in Europe
Large-scale immigration to Europe has a comparatively short history. 
While New World countries such as Australia and the United States were 
conceived – and strongly identify themselves – as countries of immigration,
European states have taken a very different approach. Indeed, it has been said
that while EU countries have very different flows and stocks of immigrants,
they share one common feature: a basic non-acceptance of immigration.1
Until recently, most migration in Europe was either local – as workers
moved from the southern Mediterranean states to north western Europe – or
was linked to the colonial history of former European empires. Examples
include the migration to the UK from the Caribbean and south Asia, and the
movement of people from north and Francophone African states to France
and Belgium. However, many EU-15 countries – such as Spain, Portugal and
Greece – remained countries of emigration, and the last country to move
from emigration to net immigration was Ireland in 1996. Since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, many of the new EU Member States have also themselves been
experiencing inward flows of migrants, from both east and west.
Migration flows in Europe have changed in several ways over the past three
decades. First, there has been an increase in intra-EU mobility. The creation
of an area of free movement within the Union has deregulated migration
within the EU-15 and separated discussions on this type of mobility from the
larger, more contentious, national immigration debates.
The concept of ‘EU citizenship’ has contributed to the sense of normality
surrounding movements from one Member State to another. There is also a
sense that the lifting of regulatory barriers has removed many of the social
obstacles that migrants once faced when moving to a new country.
However, this change in attitude towards European migrants does not yet
apply to those coming from the new members of the Union, with most still
encountering a number of transitional restrictions. Despite this, migration
from the EU-8 region remains strong.2
Second, there has been a rapid increase in the diversity of migrants as a
result of a more interconnected world, yet with continuing economic

















06 developing countries in Asia and Africa to industrialised countries,
particularly in Europe. Currently, non-EU nationals make up at least 4% of
the EU-15 population.3 The increase in the number of ‘sending’ countries
has resulted in a new ‘super-diversity’ in Europe, with many disparate
communities composed of small groups of many different nationalities.
This poses new challenges for integration. In addition to dealing with 
more established communities of second- and third-generation migrants,
policy-makers must devise ways to integrate smaller and sometimes more
fragmented communities of newcomers.
Finally, the flow of migrants has become more complex, both in terms of
their movements and their legal status. ‘Return’ and ‘circular’ migration have
become more commonplace, with cheaper travel and communications
encouraging greater mobility. An increasing proportion of the migrant
population is ‘transnational’, working in one country while maintaining a
family and social life in another. In addition, the number of legal categories
into which migrants fall has proliferated – labour, humanitarian, family
reunion and study are just some of them – and migrants often switch from
one category to another.
An example of this complexity can be seen in the UK government’s 
2006 proposal for a new, five-tiered approach to its system for managing
immigration. The aim of the reform is to simplify the existing structure under
which there are 50 different ways for potential migrants to apply to work or
study. Multiply this complexity by 25 Member States and the problems
associated with a Byzantine structure of legal status, rights and entitlements
for migrants to the EU are obvious.
As well as posing problems for any attempt to harmonise immigration policy
across Europe, this also raises questions as to how far homogenous
integration policies can address such a wide range of groups and needs.
II. 2. Migration policy at the EU level
These changes have occurred alongside a growing acceptance that
migration is here to stay – and is necessary – in 21st century Europe. A
rapidly-ageing society, combined with declining fertility, means that
Europe’s labour force is set to shrink, with the European Commission

















06Immigration is seen as a partial, but not complete, solution to the
demographic problem. Highly-skilled workers have always been welcome,
but the need for low-skilled workers – particularly in the construction,
agriculture and service sectors – is largely unacknowledged in many, if 
not all, Member States. In addition, the sector-specific skills shortages in 
IT, healthcare and engineering that have emerged in recent years have 
led many Member States to create specific immigration policies to attract
workers in these areas.
While European Council conclusions and European Commission
communications have repeatedly acknowledged the need for migration to
the EU, there has been little agreement on how to achieve this. Member
States’ priorities and needs vary widely, as do national policy-makers’
responses to the increasing complexity of the issue.
Countries such as Spain and Ireland have, until now at least, been happy to
accept large numbers of low-skilled migrant workers, recognising the role
they have played in these Member States’ recent economic prosperity. Other
countries, such as Germany and the UK, have focused on attracting highly-
skilled migrant workers through specially-designed programmes and
incentives, while placing more stringent controls on low-skilled migrants.
To date, EU immigration legislation has imposed few positive obligations on
Member States. Directives on the entry and stay of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents in EU countries (2003/109/EC), and the right to
family reunification (2003/86/EC), established minimum standards which
simply reflected existing national legislation. Indeed, Antonio Vitorino, the
former European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, expressed his
disappointment at the ‘diluted’ terms of the Family Reunification Directive.5
Moreover, common conditions for admitting international students were
only agreed in December 2004 after lengthy negotiations in the Council.
Predictably, least progress has been made in the most sensitive area for
Member States. A Commission proposal to create a single, simplified entry
procedure for migrant workers (COM(2003)386) never got off the ground
and, following a call from the European Council in 2004 for an open debate
on immigration, the Commission published a new, less ambitious proposal
for legal migration (COM(2005)669) in December 2005.
Instead of including entry and residence rights for all migrants within its

















06 employees sent by their companies to work temporarily in another Member
State (Intra-Corporate Transferees) and paid trainees.
These are uncontentious and, in some cases, marginal flows of migrants,
and the Commission offers no opinion on the more controversial issue of
low-skilled migrant labour. The general framework overlaying these specific
directives does not address entry and residence conditions, but rather
guarantees a framework of rights for migrants without long-term residence
status who have already been admitted into the EU. In this way, the
Commission neatly dodged the question of reconciling Member States’
varying policy positions on importing low-skilled labour.
Thus we can see that despite strong rhetoric about the need to review
immigration policy at the supranational level, little substantive action has
been taken – or is likely to be taken in future. Even the proposed EU ‘Green
Card’, which is intended to attract the brightest and best highly-skilled
workers (the least contentious category) to Europe, remains a nebulous
concept. Details such as the procedures and conditions for issuing such
visas, the associated rights and even how the system should be administered
have yet to be decided.
II. 3. Integration policy in Europe
Integration policy in Europe suffers from the same malady, and possibly in a
worse form. Although all Member States repeatedly declare that it is
essential to integrate migrants and ethnic minorities, the philosophy, content
and level of development of such programmes vary widely from country to
country. This lack of convergence is reflected at the European level, for both
good and bad reasons.
The European Commission’s ‘Communication on Immigration, Integration
and Employment’ (COM(2003)336) defines integration as “a two-way
process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally-
resident third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full
participation of the immigrant”. It also states that an “incremental approach”
towards integration is needed, with the balance between rights and
obligations developing over time. However, it goes on to state that
“measures should be available to all third-country nationals as early as
possible after their arrival and in any case as soon as their stay acquires a

















06The basic rationale for integrating migrants is that everyone is entitled to 
the same fundamental human rights and freedoms regardless of their
nationality, ethnic association or race, as set out in the European Convention of
Human Rights.6 The equal rights of all members of a community are reflected
in policies that promote equal opportunities and combat discrimination.
However, other motives have also been voiced in the political debate. The
Commission itself noted that “the successful integration of migrants is both
a matter for social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency”.7
Member State governments recognise that the emergence of socially-excluded
communities across Europe, particularly in urban areas, has far-reaching
consequences for their countries’ social fabric. The violence which erupted in
Paris and spread across France in late 2005 was a sign of this.
Employment rates among third-country nationals are consistently lower than for
the rest of the EU population,8 and strategies aimed at improving their labour
market participation, as part of the Lisbon Agenda to spur European productivity
and growth, have highlighted the need to address social exclusion issues.
The new security environment has also affected the integration agenda, with
the terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK, as well as increased tension in the
Netherlands, raising fears that failing to integrate migrants and minorities
will lead to further violence.
The prominence of this new security agenda could have negative effects on
the way in which integration issues are addressed. Although social exclusion
has been highlighted as a potential factor in the radicalisation of terrorists,
it is vital that integration policies are not pursued out of a narrow fear of
terrorist violence but rather from a broader understanding that social
exclusion should be avoided in any community.
a. National approaches
There is a consistent rationale for pursuing integration, despite the vast
differences in the size of migrant populations, their origins and how long
their communities have been established in each Member State.
These differences have, however, had a significant impact on how
integration policies have been developed. Approaches differ not only in

















06 EU countries which have only recently experienced large-scale immigration
are facing the integration policy challenge for the first time, and some have
yet to respond. In Ireland, for example, integration services only deal with
refugees: the Reception and Integration Agency does not have a mandate to
handle the many labour migrants and their families who have arrived in the
last few years. Instead, these are forced to rely on support from a network of
under-resourced non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and immigrant
associations which operate with little government support.
Portugal, another relative newcomer to immigration, has only begun
developing programmes in the last decade. In 2003, the government created a
High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities and a National
Immigrant Support System. This established an infrastructure for integrating
legal migrants,9 with support centres designed to help migrants with everything
from gaining access to health services and education to employment. This is
supplemented by a network of municipal partnerships with NGOs, immigrant
associations and parish councils, known as Local Immigrant Support Centres.
The underlying aim is to make the Portuguese state “the principal source of
help for the integration of immigrants”, while creating an environment of
“welcome and tolerance”. The programme is so new that it is difficult to
assess its success, but it is a proactive approach that takes advantage of 
the existence of civil society organisations which are able to carry out 
these activities.
Other Member States have a much longer history of immigration, yet have
only recently begun to address the need for integration. Germany is an
example of this. Its migrant population has grown steadily over the past 
few decades, but it was only officially recognised as a country of immigration
at the turn of the 21st century.
In 2001, the Süssmuth Commission, set up to review Germany’s
immigration laws and ascertain migrants’ future needs, criticised the lack of
any comprehensive integration plans. For the first time, new immigration
regulations which came into effect in January 2005 provide a legal basis for
integrating migrants, and detail how the financial burden should be shared
between federal and state government. Previous integration policies had
only applied to ethnic Germans returning to their ‘homeland’.
Some of the more experienced Member States are also reviewing their

















06open attitude towards immigrants, with tolerance for different cultures as the
presiding philosophy. However, in recent years, the success of this policy has
been questioned and to some extent abandoned. The high-profile murder of
film-maker Theo van Gogh heralded this change in perspective, although it is
underpinned by a broader awareness that laissez-faire policies have failed to
prevent the social exclusion of first- and second-generation migrants.
As a result, the Dutch government has tightened control of integration
through the 2005 Integration of Newcomers Act, which introduced
language tests and mandatory courses. The emphasis now is on making
migrants more responsible for their own integration.
In the UK, the integration of migrants is placed in the wider context of 
anti-discrimination and race relations – an approach more in line with that
in the United States. Integration policies focus on ensuring that migrants are
included in British society by promoting equal opportunities, rather than on
emphasising their specific needs.
UK policies make little distinction between British-born ethnic minorities
and immigrants. However, the London bombings of July 2005, perpetrated
by British-born young men, have provoked a debate about whether this
multicultural strategy is sufficient. Trevor Philips, Chairman of the
Commission for Racial Equality (the UK’s independent race relations
monitoring agency) has warned that Britain is “sleepwalking towards
segregation” and urgently needs to rethink its policies.10
Finally, in France, following widespread violence in the suburbs of Paris and
other French cities, a debate is raging over whether, and if so how, to tackle
social exclusion among first- and second-generation migrants. To date, the
French government’s approach has been to assimilate migrants: all are equal
before the law and no ethnicity or nationality (apart from French) is
recognised. As a proud secular republic, France has had trouble incorporating
some communities into society, as the controversy and resentment generated
by the decision to ban headscarves and other religious symbols in schools
showed. Despite the emphasis on equality, this and other decisions have
fostered a sense of marginalisation within France’s Muslim community.
There are few policies in France to counter social inequality through measures to
promote migrants and ethnic minorities. However, in the wake of riots reflecting
migrant youngsters’ frustrations at being unable to find jobs or break out of 



















On the one hand, affirmative action – such as anonymous job applications
and positive discrimination policies in universities – is being considered to
redress the serious barriers to employment which minorities face. On the other
hand, French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled new immigration
proposals in February 2006 designed to select entrants more carefully on the
basis of skills, and introduce a “contract of welcome and integration” for those
who wish to stay longer. The French response to the perceived integration
crisis is thus to limit future migration to those considered easiest to integrate.
It is clear that Europe is reaching a turning point in terms of addressing
integration. Just as migration flows are becoming increasingly complex, so
too the question of how to integrate those populations seems to have no
simple answers.
b. A common agenda?
These differences in philosophy have limited efforts to create a common
EU-level integration policy. Although there are a number of programmes in
place which have an impact on the integration of migrants, such as the
European Employment Strategy, there is little in the way of harmonised
legislation or common rules.
One exception is the package of EU anti-discrimination directives adopted
in 2000, which were designed to eliminate inequalities on a number of
grounds, including gender, age and race. However, even here, there is a gap
between legislation and implementation. Other efforts to foster coherence,
such as the creation of National Contact Points on Integration in 2003 and
the development of a Handbook on Integration in 2004, have focused on
promoting information exchange and best practice rather than on creating
concrete common standards.
The first edition of an annual report by the Commission’s Directorate-
General for Freedom, Security and Justice on migration and integration,
giving details of relevant policies in Member States and outlining the state
of play in the EU, was published in 2004 (a second, follow-up report has yet
to be released). The Commission has also played a role in capacity-building
at regional and local level through various dedicated funding programmes,
including EQUAL, INTI and the European Social Fund.
The most substantial achievement – and the centrepiece for the new
















06Basic Principles (CBPs) to “underpin a coherent framework on integration of
third-country nationals”.11 These principles outline the priorities which any
integration policy should address, including employment, education and
access to services. In particular, principle four states that “basic knowledge
of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable to
integration” and that “enabling migrants to acquire this basic knowledge is
essential to successful integration”.
Since then, the Commission has produced its agenda for a common policy
on integration (COM(2005)389). This uses the CBPs as a ‘cornerstone’ and
outlines a series of measures which Member States can use as a ‘check list’
to improve their integration programmes.
Some of the most relevant examples for this paper are listed on the next 
page to demonstrate the link between principle and action. The basic problem
with this approach is that, to accommodate the policy diversity among Member
States, the principles are broad statements with little substantive content.
While some EU countries, such as Sweden, pursue centrally-controlled
policies which are implemented primarily through government agencies,
others, such as Portugal, use the expertise of civil society organisations.
This, combined with the fact that governments’ integration priorities and
objectives vary substantially, means the Union needs to take a ‘scatter-gun’
approach that encompasses all the Member States’ integration strategies to
build on these principles. 
However, by proposing so many scattered, though useful, initiatives under
each principle, the Commission risks compromising the coherence of its
framework. Many of the initiatives are vague, and offer little tangible
‘guidance’ to Member States, while suggested actions at EU level are 
limited to ‘supporting’, ‘stimulating’, ‘encouraging’, ‘monitoring’,
‘promoting’ and ‘fostering’.
In addition to these suggestions, the Communication looks at ways to
improve the monitoring and evaluation of  Member States’ activities in this
area, and suggests creating an ‘integration website’ to disseminate
information, an ‘integration forum’ to bring relevant stakeholders together
and an ‘integration fund’ for the new financial period beginning in 2007.
However, the Communication remains vague as to how, and within what



















Integration is a dynamic two-way
process of mutual accommodation by
all immigrants and residents of
Member States.
Integration implies respect for the
basic values of the European Union. 
Employment is a key part of the
integration process and is central to
the participation of immigrants, to the
contributions immigrants make to the
host society and to making such
contributions visible. 
Support the training capacities of
small companies, business
organisations and trade unions in
sectors of the economy that employ
many migrants. 
Emphasise civic orientation in
introduction programmes and other
activities for newly arrived third-country
nationals so that they understand,
respect and benefit from common
European and national values.
Enhance the role of private bodies in
managing diversity. 
Common Basic Principle Suggested action at national level
Basic knowledge of the host society’s
language, history and institutions is
indispensable for integration; enabling
migrants to acquire this basic
knowledge is essential to successful
integration.
The participation of immigrants in the
democratic process and in
formulating integration policies and
measures, especially at the local
level, supports their integration.
Mainstreaming integration policies
and measures in all relevant policy
portfolios and levels of government
and public services is an important
consideration in public policy
formulation and implementation. 
Ensure that integration is an important
element of economic migration policy. 
Build migrants’ associations as sources
of advice to newcomers, and include
their representatives in introduction
programmes as trainers and role
models. 
Organise introductory programmes
and activities for newly arrived third-
country nationals to give them basic
information about language, history,
institutions, socio-economic features,
cultural life and fundamental values. 
Selected suggested measures for implementing the Common Basic Principles, as listed in
















06A key question for the Commission is whether, and if so how, to promote an
integration framework that goes beyond monitoring, information exchange
and setting guidelines and standards for Member States. Since integration is a
hugely-sensitive subject for governments (and their citizens), and following
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, it is unlikely that a detailed ‘hard law’
framework for integrating socially-excluded populations will be established.
The most recent Commission Communication notes that the 
legal framework governing the admission and stay of third-country 
nationals prescribes equal treatment and attendant rights for certain
categories of migrants, and appears to consider this an adequate legal 
basis for an integration policy when coupled with the EU’s anti-
discrimination legislation.
Nevertheless, there is scope at EU level for setting targeted guidelines, laying
down the basic responsibilities of the state towards certain, often ignored,
categories of migrants. Thus this paper will focus on what is achievable:
namely, creating soft-law guidelines and standards for the functional
integration of newcomers into a country.
c. Types and targets of integration policies
It is important to distinguish between different forms of integration policy,
the different targets, and the different levels and means by which these can
be delivered.
The integration model typically has three dimensions:
 Legal-political: This relates to the legal status of migrants and their ability
to participate in political life. The question of whether they have access to
citizenship is included within this bundle.
 Cultural-religious: This relates to the extent to which migrants can
organise themselves along cultural, religious and ethnic lines, and is the
dimension which has attracted most public attention in recent years.
Assimilationist policies, such as those used in France, are less inclined to
accommodate this aspect of integration.
 Socio-economic: This covers migrants’ access to housing, health,


















06 Each dimension can be addressed at a variety of levels and by a 
multitude of actors. It is generally accepted that most integration work takes
place at the local level, within communities, and is carried out by local
actors such as municipal and parish councils, NGOs, charities or, most
importantly, immigrants themselves. However, regional and national
governments play a key role in setting the philosophies, priorities and
frameworks for integration policies; in disseminating information and
capacity-building at the local level; and in financing initiatives.
In some countries, such as in France, the framework is established at the
national level, with a strong top-down approach. Other EU Member States,
such as Germany and Spain, have devolved much of the competence for 
this – including the budgeting – to regional authorities.
The role NGOs play in implementing integration policies depends on
whether such policies are designed to give migrants access to mainstream
public services such as health or education, or to tackle migrants’ specific
needs, such as language and introductory programmes. In some cases,
NGOs play a dominant role out of necessity, filling the gaps that government
policies fail to address. Countries in the middle of developing their own
approaches to migrants are now realising that considerable expertise already
exists at the local level.
For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant distinction is between the
different types of migrants these policies are aimed at.
There are two broad categories of migrants typically covered by integration
policies: new arrivals, and established second- and third-generation 
migrant communities. While the needs of these two groups diverge
considerably, the packages of measures designed to cater for each 
group may merge or overlap over time. Integration is a process and the
dimensions of that process change with time.
New arrivals face specific problems – such as language difficulties, 
lack of familiarity with the host culture and institutions, and the 
need to find housing and access vital social services such as healthcare 
and education – which do not apply to established, second-generation
immigrants. Conversely, issues of political participation, cultural 
identity and long-term social exclusion, while of paramount 


















06If the needs of the newcomers are not addressed, this will affect their ability
to participate politically, economically and socially further down the line,
but the question of whether they can vote in local elections is rarely their
top priority during their first weeks in a new country. In the same way, a
newly-arrived migrant is likely to find life more difficult if the social network
of immigrants which he or she joins is poorly integrated into society.
Most European countries’ integration policies have recognised this dichotomy,
and provide introductory and orientation programmes for newcomers
alongside long-term measures to address social and economic exclusion.
Those countries where immigration is an entirely new phenomenon have yet
to address the long-term problems of social inequality and exclusion, but are
keenly watching the impact of measures designed to tackle social unrest
within immigrant communities in neighbouring countries.
It seems, however, that while the strategies themselves may be
comprehensive, they are targeted at a very narrowly-defined section of the
population. The remainder of this paper focuses on integration policies for
newcomers and, more specifically, on the scope of introductory programmes
designed to provide them with the basic tools to function in their new society.
The majority of national programmes have their origins in the 1990s. One
exception is Sweden, which has run orientation programmes for newcomers
since the 1970s, although the low level of Swedish immigration has made it
relatively easy to implement these programmes.
Such programmes typically include some level of language training,
vocational support (to help migrants to integrate into the labour market), and
orientation courses to familiarise them with their host society, its norms,
institutions and laws, and to help them become self-reliant.
This is seen as an essential first step in the integration process. Although
these programmes are not only directed towards those who arrive intending
to settle (see table on page 22), the ability of migrants to gain permanent
residence and citizenship rights is increasingly linked to their successful
completion of such courses. Conversely, the exclusion of non-permanent
immigrants from these programmes appears to be based on the rationale that
they should not be encouraged to settle permanently thanks to the skills and
knowledge they might acquire through migrant support programmes. As
they are expected to leave after a set period of time, they are not considered



















Country Target Temporary Student EU Content
migrant
Austria TCNs* on Language 
permanent X ? X tuiton, civic
residence track instruction
Belgium TCNs with Language 
permission to X X X tuition, 
reside for more social and
than three months institutional
orientation
Denmark Legal immigrants Language
& refugees who fall ? ?12 X tuition, social










France Legal newcomers Language 
with a prospect X X X tuition, social
of permanent orientation
residence
Germany Regular & Language 





Netherlands Recognised refugees Language 
& residence permit X ? X tuition, 
holders (except for vocational
employment purposes) training
Sweden13 Refugees. While in Individual 
theory introductory X X X integration 
programmes are open plan, education
to all, this depends on & training, 
regional and municipal language





Introductory programmes for migrants in selected European countries14
*TCN = third-country nationals; 


















Given the wide array and complexity of legal migration channels
into Europe, and the increasing mobility of migrants, it would be
foolish to ignore the growing proportion who arrive without any initial
intention to settle. Yet it is striking that, to date, governments have taken a
one-size-fits-all approach towards integrating migrants into Europe.
What tailoring does occur is largely negative: for example, certain
categories of migrants (undocumented or temporary workers, or asylum
seekers) are prevented from integrating for conceptual and largely political
reasons. Indeed, current policies which single out certain migrants – for
example, the controversial decision in several German Länder to introduce
questionnaires for Muslim migrants – alienate rather than integrate.
This chapter has highlighted the many challenges facing national governments
in dealing with a moving, multi-faceted, many-sectored immigrant
population. The next chapter highlights three increasingly significant types of
migrant who are, for the most part, excluded from European integration
strategies. It then suggests that there is a middle way to offer social support to
all new arrivals which does not undermine longer-term integration strategies,


















III. Forgotten migrant populations
This paper argues that current integration policies are responding to an
outdated paradigm,15 as they are based on the premise that migration is a
one-time event, where families arrive intending to settle and adopt the host
country as their permanent home.
In many instances, this is still the case. However, settler migration now
constitutes a rapidly-diminishing proportion of the total migration flow.
Increasingly, migrants move with the intention of staying for only a few years
or commuting between countries (although some of them may later decide
to settle permanently).
These migrants face considerable barriers to integration, either because
they are not considered worth the investment or in need of integrating or
because the authorities do not want to encourage them to stay. 
This paper takes three migrant populations which are likely to increase in
size over the next few decades in Europe and are, for the most part,
considered beneficial to the host country’s economy, and assesses whether
they need integration services. If they do, what are those needs and what
kind of policies should be pursued?
The three categories below are not an exhaustive list of ‘forgotten’ 
migrants – other groups such as undocumented migrant workers also merit
consideration.
III. 1. Temporary migrant workers
Temporary Migration Programmes (TMPs) have been used to address labour
shortages in Europe in two broad cycles.
The first, post-war ‘guest-worker programmes’ were introduced between
1945 and the early 1970s, and largely involved intra-European migration
from poorer Mediterranean countries to northern Europe.
This generation of TMPs imported low-skilled labour into a variety of sectors,
including construction and agriculture, to help rebuild Europe following


















temporary labour migrants were recruited through bilateral agreements
(1945-1975) and government policies stemmed partly from a desire to foster
cultural ties with North Africa and former colonies. Germany also used
bilateral agreements with a number of countries, although the Gastarbeiter
Programme (1955-1973) was solely a labour market policy tool. At the peak
of this programme, migrants represented 12% of salaried workers.16
Various reasons were given for phasing out these programmes. One was the
onset of economic recession and higher unemployment in receiving
countries; another was a realisation among host governments that ensuring
migration remained temporary was more difficult than they had originally
envisaged. Certainly, a desire to control the number of migrants was a
significant factor as countries across Europe closed their doors to both
temporary and permanent arrivals.
The second generation of TMPs in Europe are more diverse, both in
composition and objectives. In the 1990s, European governments and
employers became aware of specific sectoral shortages in the labour market,
and sought to use temporary and seasonal labour to tackle them. Western
European countries are thus devising multiple micro-programmes aimed at
filling these particular gaps.17
In some cases, unskilled workers are needed to make up for shortages in the
service, agriculture and construction sectors. For example, in Spain, the
majority of work permits for non-EU workers are issued for the service sector.18
In the UK, there are shortages of both low-skilled workers (in hospitality and
food processing) and highly-skilled employees (in engineering, health and IT).
Given these needs, policy-makers are revising immigration programmes in an
effort to attract more of the world’s highly-skilled workforce.
In addition to specific temporary migration schemes, many countries 
issue time-restricted work permits as a more general – and politically
acceptable – tool of immigration policy. Ireland, for example, currently
issues one-year work permits which are renewable indefinitely.
The recent European Commission Communication on transitional
arrangements for EU-8 workers highlights the extent to which migration in
Europe has become temporary: in France, 74% of work authorisations in 
2004 were for seasonal work, 11% for temporary work and just 5% 
for permanent work; in Germany, 95% of work permits issued included 
















06 on temporary migrant schemes across Europe, given the number of such
programmes and their complexity.
Assessments of how effective temporary migration programmes in Europe have
been have focused on the benefits for the host country and on whether the
programme’s initial objectives have been achieved. They examine, in particular,
whether the ‘temporary’ aspect of these programmes has been successful – and
the majority conclude that it has not. (The most oft-cited example of this is
Germany’s Gastarbeiter programme. Even though the majority of workers who
arrived under the scheme eventually returned home, many did not.)20
The lesson for policy-makers from the first wave of programmes was that a
proportion of those arriving under any TMP are likely to become permanent. 
It is worth briefly outlining the differences between the first and second
generation of temporary migrants.21
First, those now arriving under temporary migration schemes – and immigrating
generally – are more ethnically diverse than before. Although many countries
still operate through bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, Europe’s
need for particular skills has led it to cast its migration net wider.
Second, because the immigrant population (some of whom arrived under
the previous generation of TMPs) is much larger than before, new temporary
workers are entering a far more diverse social environment. Globalisation
has created more deregulated labour markets that are capable of responding
more flexibly to changes in the economy. It has also made it easier for
people to travel the world. A job is no longer for life and there is an
increasing trend toward circular, and more frequent, migration, as opposed
to permanent settlement.
These differences have implications for the success of these programmes.
The ease of international travel and flexibility in the labour market make
migrants more likely to move on once they have completed a job. In
addition, specific shortages in certain sectors of the host country’s labour
market suggest that employers may become increasingly dependent on the
external labour supply.
The major preoccupation for those designing TMPs has been to ensure that
this migration remains short term, rather than to consider the potential social

















06Martin Ruhs has argued that the draconian policies required to ensure that
all temporary migrants return home may not be compatible with the norms
and values of a liberal democracy.22 Instead, governments have taken a more
passive approach to the problem by limiting certain rights, such as those to
family reunification, access to social welfare, and the ability to legitimately
switch to permanent immigration tracks. Some countries have proposed
more innovative responses to encourage migrant workers to return home,
such as requiring them to pay a bond which is only refunded when they
leave, or transferring part of their wages to an account in their home country. 
The idea of linking migrants’ rights to their length of stay is neither new nor
contentious, and the Commission supports this ‘incremental approach’.23
This paper does not propose offering the full panoply of integration
measures and social support to migrants immediately on arrival. However,
the failure of governments to provide basic introductory programmes for 
all migrants to familiarise them with the host country’s laws, institutions and
society seems short-sighted. Should there be a basic level of integration for
migrants on temporary work permits?
a. Should temporary migrants be integrated?
As noted above, the primary rationale for deciding not to integrate
temporary migrants is that doing so might deter them from returning home. 
Certainly there are some ‘benefits’, such as political and voting rights,
which do not apply to transitory workers. Furthermore, migrants might not
wish, or need, to uproot their families for a short period of time (although
they would almost certainly reconsider this if their work permits were
repeatedly renewed).
Furthermore, the hottest debate in Europe about multiculturalism and
religious integration relates mainly to settled migrant communities (although
it is worth noting that many of them originally arrived as temporary workers).
The lack of any measures to integrate these workers socially risks creating a
second-class, expendable labour force, particularly among seasonal and
unskilled workers. Without an adequate understanding of the host country’s
employment system, migrant workers may be left unaware of their


















06 Without adequate support to find decent housing, they rely on word of
mouth and on their employers to find accommodation. This can often result
in large numbers of them living clustered in one area, in poor conditions
and with little interaction with the broader community. Without adequate
knowledge of the host language, or the public service structure, they may
have difficulties accessing health or social support services.
Examples of this can be found across Europe. In Ireland, the exploitation 
of migrant workers has been a key concern for trade unions and NGOs.
Under the current system, migrant workers may drop out of the work 
permit system without realising it because they rely on employers to 
renew their work permits annually. Those who are employed illegally, who
work too many hours or are paid below the minimum wage, have to rely on 
trade unions and others to explain their rights to them, and this only
happens, all too often, if they complain. Many do not do so out of fear that
they will be sacked and deported if they speak up. Lack of knowledge 
has disempowered many workers and left many of them vulnerable 
to exploitation.24
In France, Spain and other countries, both legal and illegal seasonal workers
also have to rely on employers to find them accommodation, and this is
frequently substandard.25 In addition many of them try to live cheaply as
possible so that they can send a considerable proportion of their income
home. Discovering that they will not get much government support even
though they have a work permit is surely a disincentive for them to maintain
their legal status, even if they know how to or are able to do so.
The European Commission’s ‘First Annual Report on Migration and
Integration’26 stressed that basic language skills are vital if people are to
participate effectively in their community, and particularly in the workplace.
However, few countries ensure that temporary migrants are given these
skills. In his study of agricultural labour migration in the United States,
Philip Martin has noted that some large employers have resorted to hiring
bilingual managers in order to communicate with a largely migrant
workforce.27 While this may be a rational and economic solution for
employers, it leaves many workers isolated and unequipped to deal with life
outside the workplace.
Marginalised communities, often composed of a mixture of permanent,
temporary and illegal workers, are taking root in many European cities. It is

















06support, in the form of an introductory programme, as this would enable
them to stand up for their rights. While this would not solve the problems of
marginalisation per se, it would minimise some of the temporary labour
force’s inherent vulnerabilities.
So are governments’ fears that integration turns temporary migrants
into permanent ones justified? This will inevitably happen sometimes and
policy-makers need to be realistic about this – and recognise that it is not
necessarily negative, either economically or socially.
As sectors such as agriculture, construction and the service industry
become more reliant on unskilled migrant labour, temporary workers may
become long-term – a phenomenon known as ‘distortion and dependence’.
A constantly-rotating workforce in sectors which rely on temporary workers
places a heavy burden on employers to comply with the current regulations.
This has fostered a trend towards outsourcing labour supply to private
recruitment companies, which can ensure a steady stream of labour but
often in a largely unregulated environment.28
In the absence of new workers, employers are keen to retain those already
in place. An example of this occurs in Ireland, where the work permit system
is employer-driven and allows for unlimited renewals. In 2004, more than
twice as many renewals were issued as new permits (23,246 renewals,
10,020 new permits), reflecting an enduring demand for labour in certain
sectors.29 However, these temporary workers enjoy de facto, but not de jure,
permanent status, as they do not have the option of taking up long-term
residence. As a result, their integration is delayed indefinitely, which could
lead to serious social exclusion problems in the future.
In the absence of adequate permanent channels of entry into Europe, TMPs
will inevitably continue to be abused by those who wish to stay for as long
as possible. The terms of some of Europe’s temporary migration policies
hardly encourage workers to remain temporary.
For example, the UK’s recent effort to attract low-skilled temporary workers
through the Sectors-Based-Scheme can be classed as a failure.30 Under the
terms of the scheme, workers – in particular Bangladeshis – were paying a
great deal of money for permits and travel to the UK in order to take up
minimum-wage positions. As they were unable to recoup the initial costs of


















06 In Spain, irregular migrants already in the country were offered temporary
work permits under an ‘amnesty’ policy in an effort to scale back the
‘shadow’ economy. It has yet to be seen whether they will return home or
revert to irregular status when their visas expire. It is notable that Canada
attributes the success of its own temporary labour programmes to the fact
that permanent channels are open to potential migrants. Those who arrive
intending to settle generally come via the permanent track, and the two
channels are kept separate.
An introductory programme per se is unlikely to encourage a worker
to stay permanently. Indeed, the number of migrants who participated in the
post-war TMPs and became permanent despite an overt policy of
non-integration suggests that the desire to remain permanently may have
less to do with integration policies than with the offer of a good job and a
solid network of friends and family. As Philip Martin has pointed out,
“migrants are people whose aspirations and goals change with
experience”.32 In short, life happens, irrespective of policy.
b. How can temporary migrants be properly integrated?
As the above discussion suggests, temporary migrants’ main needs are to
obtain adequate information about their host country and their rights, and
to learn to speak the language. This mirrors the content of the current
introductory programmes in a number of European countries. While many
Member States provide websites and pamphlets where migrants can get
information, experience suggests that a more proactive approach is needed
to ensure that all the relevant information reaches its target audience.
The emphasis should be on functional integration, so that any newcomer is
given the knowledge and skills to be self-reliant in the host society. Key
aspects of this include basic language training; vocationally-oriented,
practical information on employment and immigration rights; guidance on
government and community institutions; and advice on how to gain access
to essential services.
What is the best way to deliver these programmes? A constant theme in the
political debate is the question of who pays for them. It is clear that
employers and private recruiters play a key role in the welfare of their
migrant workers and are likely to invest more in highly-skilled employees,
recognising that their productivity is linked to their welfare and happiness.

















06the investment, so they often ignore their social needs. Thus it tends to fall
to NGOs, trade unions and immigrant networks to provide support, and they
are often overstretched and under-resourced.
There are, however, rare examples of employers providing such services:
Fusion Personnel, a supplier of casual labour (gangmaster) in the British
agricultural sector, has developed a training scheme with a local college that
provides language tuition. In the Netherlands, an In-House Integration Project
offers migrant workers language, vocational and communication training, plus
guidance for managers.33 These programmes suggest that there is scope (though
little incentive) for employers and recruiters to provide basic introductory
programmes for migrant workers who arrive under temporary programmes.34
This paper proposes that a government which wishes to introduce TMPs
could insist that employers are only given access to migrant workers if they
agree to provide those workers with introductory programmes. Larger
companies could implement these in-house, while a variety of other 
actors – regional and local government and NGOs – could provide
programmes for smaller businesses.
As integration services are provided on a different basis from country to
country, this should be left to national and regional discretion, although
there is a role for the EU in setting standards. 
A link could be made between issuing work permits and ensuring that
migrants are properly integrated by requiring potential employers of foreign
workers to sign up to a code of conduct outlining their obligations and
setting minimum standards of integration. This would not only ensure that
migrants receive some pastoral care in the workplace, but could also help
to minimise the risk of employers exploiting their workforces by creating
positive obligations. Finally, making employers responsible for initial
orientation programmes would reduce public-sector costs while ensuring
proper provision.
III. 2. International students
The movement of people for academic reasons is often overlooked as a
source of migration. According to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the international market in

















06 Europe is a major player, with the EU hosting approximately 47% of the
world’s international students.36
Although in 2003 around 28% of these were EU citizens studying in another
Member State, there were approximately 750,000 third-country nationals
studying in Europe. France, Germany and the UK are the biggest receivers
of international students, but other countries are catching up: currently ten
of the EU’s 25 Member States are net exporters of education services; i.e.
they are welcoming more foreign students than they are sending abroad.37
The programmes developed to attract international students after World War
II had a cultural and social rationale. However, over the last two decades,
European countries have begun to appreciate the economic benefits of
increasing foreign enrolment in tertiary education. Universities in a number
of countries have reaped direct financial benefits from this by increasing
tuition fees for non-EU nationals, effectively subsidising higher education for
national students.
In addition, as shortages for skilled workers have become more acute,












































































06motivated individuals to study and train within the country, as this creates a
potential supply of highly-skilled workers. Hence, a number of countries
have adjusted their visa policies to allow non-EU students to enter the
labour market after graduation.
In Germany, new immigration legislation which came into effect on 
1 January 2005 allows foreign students to apply for a one-year job-seekers
permit after they graduate. If they manage to find work, they can then apply
for a work and residence visa and eventually join the permanent residence
track. In the UK, a programme which allows graduates in physical sciences,
engineering and mathematics to apply for one-year extensions to their visas
(and an eventual switch to the highly-skilled migrant programme)
demonstrates how easily the foreign student population can be ‘strained’ to
select those with the most essential skills.
a. Marketing education services
Many European countries have created national agencies to market their
universities abroad and boost overseas demand for their education
services.38 There have also been a number of initiatives at European level to
harmonise higher education provision.
The most influential of these has been the Bologna Process to establish a
European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. This process is under 
way in more than 40 countries and aims to harmonise quality assurance
systems, get agreement on the mutual recognition of qualifications 
across borders, and create a degree system based on two cycles
(undergraduate and graduate).
A key objective, as spelt out in the most recent ministerial communiqué, is
to promote mobility within the EHEA and enhance its attractiveness relative
to other parts of the world.39 The European Commission, which has been
closely involved in this process, is part of the follow-up group that is
monitoring progress, with the Directorate-General for Education and
Training playing a coordinating role with national authorities, student and
university associations.
Although national governments retain regulatory powers over education, the
Commission is taking a keen interest in the development of the education
sector because education and training are seen as a vital part of the Lisbon

















06 However, despite the desire of governments and universities to promote
education services among foreign students, they appear to have overlooked
the social dimension of the process. Students are seen as consumers of a
service rather than as migrants in a new and demanding environment.
The Bologna Process Follow-up Group argued in 2003 that “it is necessary
to introduce and maintain social support schemes for students, including
grants, portable as far as possible, loan schemes, healthcare and insurance,
housing and academic and social counselling”.40 Unfortunately, this has not
been reflected in the subsequent work programme.
Both the National Union of Students in Europe (ESIB) and the European
University Association (EUA) have criticised governments’ failure to address
the social needs of the general student population. While academic and
educational system reforms are seen as national and supra-national
concerns, the social dimension of education remains largely ad hoc and is
determined on a university-by-university basis.
b. The international student and social integration
There is little policy-oriented research on the social needs of international
students in Europe, particularly on the difficulties they face in integrating
into local society. However, there is considerable research on the problems
they face in adapting to a new culture, learning the language, coping with
the loss of social support systems, establishing new social networks, and
dealing with racial discrimination, housing and financial difficulties, and
academic stress.
A survey by the UK Council For International Education (UKCOSA) of
international student experiences found that a key concern for many was
how to integrate with UK students and residents.41 The majority of
respondents (59%) said most of their friendships were with co-nationals and
other international students, and Asian students were far less likely to have
British friends than EU nationals. Students found mixing with local
communities particularly difficult. However, they said the overall
experience had been positive, although the UK’s National Union of Students
believes that foreign nationals in higher education experience greater
problems than the UKCOSA survey suggests.
Much of the research makes recommendations to academic institutions and

















06students. However, very little of this addresses the role governments might
play. Although international educational exchanges are seen as a useful tool
in promoting inter- and multiculturalism, much less is said about the very
real needs of exchange students at national or international level and how
to respond to them.
c. Policies
A study of Australian students concluded that economic and social support
for international students was provided by “a fragmented complex of
institutions, agencies and support networks”.42
A similar situation exists in Europe. Government integration strategies appear
to have neglected international students, even though they constitute a
significant and increasing flow of third-country nationals to Europe. This may
be because many governments do not regard students as migrants and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) specifically excludes them from its
definition of a migrant.
Other governments exclude foreign students from integration policies on the
basis that they only plan to stay in the country for the duration of their
course, which might only last a few months. While it may not be necessary
to offer comprehensive support for students on short, intensive language
courses, undergraduate courses typically last for 3-4 years and postgraduate
courses even longer. In addition, as noted above, European countries now
recognise the value of recruiting foreign graduates as part of their strategies
for obtaining highly-skilled labour.
In this context, it is foolhardy to ignore the social needs of international
students simply because they are only temporary, not least because this
could ultimately inhibit their successful absorption into the national
employment market.
There are, however, some support and integration services for international
students. Universities and independent organisations offer a wide range of
services, such as orientation programmes, housing and financial advice,
language courses and counselling, most of which are provided through the
university network.
As part of their pastoral duty to all students, universities also offer

















06 international students may depend on the number of foreign nationals
enrolled at each institution.
Some universities, particularly in countries with small populations, rely on
international students to subsidise and augment academic programmes and
are therefore geared up to cater for a culturally-diverse population. Smaller,
publicly-funded institutions with only a small percentage of overseas
students are more likely to provide services on an ad hoc basis. As a result,
the level of support these students receive depends on the level of
enthusiasm and resources available at each university and college.
Foreign students receive little off-campus support aside from that provided
by governmental and non-governmental agencies, which provide distant
(telephone and web-based) advice and support, and handbooks on
particular issues. Independent agencies also play a crucial advocacy role in
protecting international students’ interests. In some cases, however, the
main role of government-operated agencies (such as the Netherlands
Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education) appears to
be to market education services to prospective students rather than to offer
them impartial advice and support.
In essence, integration and support services for students are not regulated
nationally. Although there are some professional associations for educators
of international students which provide guidelines, training and codes of
ethical conduct, there is no official mechanism for setting standards and
monitoring compliance.43
d. How can international students be properly integrated?
If education services are to be attractive to foreign students, it is vital that
these students are guaranteed social welfare during their courses. This is
particularly important as host countries show an increasing tendency to
cherry pick the brightest and best from among the ranks of foreign graduates
for their own labour markets.
Given the efforts to harmonise education services both through the Bologna
Process and through the EU itself, it would be appropriate to establish a
pan-European mechanism for monitoring the provision of basic integration
and social support.
So how can governments ensure that they receive the necessary social support
36
during their studies? New Zealand provides a good example of best practice.
Even though it has a population of only 4 million, the country is host to more
than 100,000 foreign students and the market is increasing rapidly.44 During
the academic year 2003/4, it was worth over 2 million New Zealand dollars
(1,110,000 euros) and it is seen as a vital ‘export’ industry.
Given the commercial importance of international education, the New Zealand
government has taken steps to address the social dimension. In 2003, the
Ministry of Education established a Code of Practice for the Pastoral Care of
International Students to provide a framework for educational institutions.45 All
university staff and agents offering education are now subject to the code 
and an independent public agency – the International Education Appeals
Authority – monitors and rules on students’ complaints about alleged breaches.
The code covers a number of areas, such as the provision of information to
prospective international students and a range of support services, including:
 an orientation programme;
 assistance for students who face difficulties adapting to a new cultural 
environment;
 advocacy procedures to ensure students are aware of their rights;
 information on accommodation;
 advice on driving laws, courses, welfare facilities (including personal and
mental health services);
 information on national laws, especially discrimination and harassment
legislation;
 linguistic preparation.
The areas covered by the code are politically uncontentious. It is arguable
that since many universities already provide most of these services to their
students, the code merely ensures that all institutions conform. Introducing
a similar code at European level – perhaps as part of the Bologna Process –
would fill the current regulatory gap in relation to the integration of foreign
students, as well as making it more attractive to institutions and
governments which wish to increase their share of the education market.
III. 3. EU-8 migrant workers
Creating an area of free movement has had repercussions for official

































06 associated with citizenship, it is frequently forgotten that some may face just
as many problems in terms of language, social support and knowledge of
their host institutions as their non-EU counterparts do.
EU nationals are excluded from the majority of introductory programmes set
up for newcomers in recent years (see table on page 22). The implications
of this become clear when one considers the movement of workers from
central and eastern Europe over the past decade. Though these workers are
now officially EU citizens, they still face many of the same social barriers as
they did before May 2004.
38
Country Type of Data EU-10
Number % working age 
population
Austria Work permit 68,449 1.2
Belgium Residence permit 12,918 0.2
Denmark Residence permit 4,911 0.1
Germany Work permit 497,298 0.9
Greece Residence permit 3,711 0.1
Finland Residence permit 1,651 0.0
France Work permit 9,916 0.0
Ireland Registered EU-8 (May-Dec) 53,829 1.9
Italy Work auth. application 26,324 0.1
Netherlands Work permit 24,424 0.2
Portugal Residence permit 43 0.0
Spain Residence permit 11,255 0.0
Sweden Residence permit 3,514 0.1
UK Registered EU-8 (May-Dec) 134,530 0.4
Residence/work permits to EU-10 nationals in absolute numbers and 
as percentages of the destination country’s working age population 
aged 15-64, in 2004.
Source: European Commission, Report on the Functioning of the Transitional
















06a. Post-accession movement of workers from central and eastern Europe
When ten new countries joined the Union in May 2004, just three of the
‘old’ EU-15 Member States allowed unrestricted access to their labour
markets: Ireland, Sweden and the UK. Others – including Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany and Spain – have continued to treat these new EU 
citizens as third-country nationals, taking advantage of the permitted
‘transitional period’ of up to seven years. A third group of countries –
Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal – have maintained pre-existing
immigration regimes, but created quotas for workers from the new 
Member States.
Despite these restrictions, there have been significant flows from central and
eastern Europe to EU-15 countries (see table on page 38 for figures). In the
first year following accession, the UK welcomed 175,000 EU-8 workers,
Ireland 85,000 and Sweden nearly 22,000 – and even though Germany
maintained its national system, nearly half a million EU-8 workers worked
within its borders in 2004.46
Polish workers are by far the largest EU-8 population abroad. The most 
recent figures from the UK, for example, show that they now account for 
131,300 (57%) of the 231,500 registered EU-8 workers.47 Germany granted
some 680,000 work permits to Polish workers in 2004 and the first 
half of 2005.
New Member State workers find jobs in a wide range of sectors. While the
majority of these are unskilled – in hospitality, construction, agriculture and
factory work – the stereotype of the ‘Polish plumber’ reflects the growing
demand for skilled labourers (including electricians and carpenters) from
central and eastern Europe in the construction industry.
New Member States are developing special training programmes for 
highly-skilled workers and are tailoring their higher education towards
‘exporting’ some of their graduates: for example, a training course for
dentists in Warsaw teaches potential emigrants about the British National
Health Service and offers vocational language training.48
The significant number of EU-8 workers in the EU-15, especially in those
countries where transitional measures are in force, suggests that there is still
strong demand for labour from central and eastern Europe. However, the

















06 above, EU nationals are explicitly excluded from introductory programmes
in countries such as Austria, Belgium and Denmark.49
b. Are Polish migrants more integrated than Ukrainian migrants?
So has EU accession made integration any easier? In countries which
have opened up their labour markets to the new Member States, EU
citizenship has given EU-8 workers a bundle of employment and 
social rights. However, some countries – such as Ireland and the UK – have
limited EU-8 workers’ access to some social welfare benefits, while in
others, they only enjoy some citizenship rights, such as the ability to ‘export’
their pensions and aggregate their social security contributions.50
Reports suggest that migrant workers from the new Member States in the UK and
Ireland remain in a vulnerable position. An exposé in a leading UK newspaper
in January 2005 revealed that, even though they are working legally, EU-8
workers are still being exploited by employers who pay unlawfully low wages
and force them to live in squalid conditions.51 They work alongside
undocumented migrants from non-EU countries such as Afghanistan, and many
are not legally registered with the government and are threatened by their
employers if they attempt to contact the authorities. 
This does not only apply to workers from new Member States. There have been
similar reports of Portuguese workers being abused in south east England.
A key factor is that new arrivals often do not speak the host country language,
are unaware of their employment rights, and have little knowledge of whom to
contact and how. An even-more worrying report from Ireland’s Homeless
Agency shows that a small but increasing number of citizens from the new
Member States are being forced to seek help from Dublin’s homelessness
services.52 Many of those interviewed had been insufficiently prepared for their
journey and did not have the appropriate language skills.
In terms of their knowledge, culture and language skills, the integration
needs of EU nationals such as Poles or Latvians are similar to those of
migrant workers from third countries such as Romania or Ukraine. EU
citizenship and freedom of movement have conferred no special ‘powers’
on them, and they remain vulnerable.
It appears that workers from the EU-8 countries living in Ireland do actively

















06not depends on their knowledge, language skills and access to appropriate
institutions. Here, NGOs and trade unions have played a vital role in
empowering them.
With transitional arrangements for the movement of workers from central
and eastern Europe due for review in May 2006, it is essential to address
their integration needs as soon as possible. A number of EU-15 Member
States – including Finland, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain – have indicated that they may relax immigration restrictions later this
year. If they do, they will also need to ensure that workers who arrive under
the new arrangements are capable of functioning in their host community.
c. How can EU-8 migrant workers be properly integrated?
There is clearly a need for an EU-wide policy on introductory measures for
EU-8 workers, and the Union has the competence to do this. The right to
free movement within the EU means that the Union should draw up
standards for social support. The needs of EU-8 workers and other EU
nationals are no different from those of other new arrivals.
Introductory programmes are one element of this. However, as its title
suggests, the Commission’s ‘Communication for a Common Agenda on
Integration for Third Country Nationals’ does not cover EU citizens who
work and live in another Union country. Regardless of this, a more
comprehensive proactive information programme for potential migrants
should be adopted within the EU.
2006 is the European Year of Workers’ Mobility (EYWM). According to the
Commission, 1.6% of EU-25 citizens live and work in a Member State other
than their own, and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment
and Social Affairs is encouraging the European workforce to become more
mobile.53 At the EYWM launch conference in February 2006, British MEP
Jean Lambert stressed the importance of ensuring that the social needs of the
mobile workforce are not forgotten.
Although linguistic ability has been highlighted by the EYWM as essential
for job mobility in Europe, the Year’s focus is on informing potential 
migrants about job opportunities in other countries through job fairs 
and the EURES job portal. This portal offers information about the 
practical side of living and working in each Member State, but provides 

















06 EYWM is an ideal opportunity to address the need for introductory
programmes for EU workers living and working in other Member States, and

















06IV. Tailoring integration policies
To date, integration policies in Europe have mainly focused on those who
arrive intending to settle permanently in the host society, and it is frequently
suggested that integrating temporary migrants is inherently contradictory.
This need not be so. While core integration policies, including rights of
citizenship and family reunification, should be developed for those who
intend to stay permanently (and those who decide to settle at a later stage),
there should be a broader orientation and introduction policy for all new
arrivals in a host country, regardless of their status and length of stay. 
The fact that European governments increasingly recognise that
naturalisation and citizenship are valuable elements of integration for those
who wish to settle permanently is to be welcomed, but it does not necessary
follow that these should be the goals of all integration strategies.
If governments saw integration as a broader process of orientation and a way
of giving migrants the means to function effectively in society irrespective of
how long they intend to stay, they would be able to target a wider range of
migrant groups.
43
Integration policies for all migrants:
anti-discrimination; language classes,
introductory programmes etc.
The interaction between integration policies for all 
migrants and permanent settlers
Integration policies for permanent
















06 These policies should be based on a dual acceptance that a) migration is
increasingly temporary and circulatory, but b) a proportion of migrants are
always likely to become permanent either because of a change in their
personal circumstances or because the host country’s needs and policies
change. To ignore a substantial foreign population in the hope that social
exclusion will encourage them to return home is, at best, irresponsible and, at
worst, will cause even greater difficulties for long-term integration strategies.
Most integration takes place at the local level. This should not mean,
however, that the sole role of national and EU policy-makers is to establish
broad, homogenous policy guidelines. They can also play a vital role in
focusing efforts locally and highlighting the particular contribution that
employers, institutions and more permanent migrant communities can make.
IV. 1. A role for the European Union
The first question to ask is why should codes of conduct to integrate new
arrivals be developed at EU level? Most obviously, this would promote
homogeneity. The Hague Programme mandated the Commission to
create a European framework for integration and noted the need for national
policies to converge in a number of areas, including “basic skills for
participation in society”.54
The prominent role played by employers in introducing new arrivals to
European society makes codes of conduct ensuring minimum standards in
orientation policies, advice and language-learning opportunities vitally
relevant to the Lisbon Agenda. Migrants who have a secure status and a good
understanding of their host country’s institutions, laws and society are likely
to be more productive and of greater economic benefit.
Turning to the three categories of migrant identified above – temporary
migrant workers, international students and EU-8 migrant workers – there are
clear reasons for a common approach.
First, Member States are competing for skilled and (increasingly) unskilled
workers, not just between themselves but also with North American and other
industrialised states. In order to attract the best to Europe, Member States need
to offer all migrants good conditions, including those who only come for a short
time. The same reasoning applies to attracting international students and, here,

















06approach. Finally, with respect to EU-8 workers’ mobility, the Union has an
obligation to ensure that EU nationals have the tools to function effectively in
any Union country. Although the EU’s competence in the area of integration
policy is limited to third-country nationals, it is clear that some EU citizens
need similar strategies and support.
The second question is how to create common guidelines and standards for
effective introductory programmes. The ‘Communication for a Common
Agenda for Integration’ proposed an integration forum to bring together
representatives of all stakeholders in the integration process at the  EU level.
This would be an appropriate forum for employers, universities, national,
regional and local government, NGOs and immigrants themselves to 
develop a series of codes of conduct which could then be applied at national
level. The EU could then use its role as the monitor and facilitator of
information-exchange to promote better practices among Member States.
These codes should not be designed to regulate service delivery, since a
comparison of Member States’ integration infrastructures shows that some are
better at providing a broad government integration structure, while others use
the expertise of existing NGO support services.
The key here is to ensure that migrants do not fall victim to their location, legal
status and circumstances. As has already been explained, they often depend
on their local community’s resources and enthusiasm – whether at parish
council, employer or local government level – to provide social support.
Codes of conduct would provide a basic homogenous benchmark of services
which migrants could expect to receive when they enter the host society,
regardless of how long they intend to stay or where they intend to live.
IV. 2. Ways ahead
In conclusion, there are a number of policy recommendations which should
be considered:
1) Member States should introduce integration programmes for all
newcomers from day one, irrespective of the migrant’s intended length of
stay in the host country.
2) Minimum standards should be set for introductory programmes. These

















06 some basic standards of delivery. All newcomers should have the opportunity
to participate in programmes provided locally, although they should not 
be obliged to do so. Language courses should be geared towards vocational
and practical skills to make migrants self-sufficient in their host community.
Well-honed orientation programmes should be provided which give an
overview of public services, host cultures and community structures, and
explain how to obtain further government assistance and information.
3) The European Commission should thoroughly research the roles that
employers, trade unions, recruitment agencies, universities and other
organisations receiving migrants play in the initial introduction of 
migrants into the host community. In doing so, it should draw on best
practice – where it exists – within these organisations across Europe, and
identify key areas for responsible action by these players.
4) The Commission should take the lead in working with stakeholders to
develop codes of conduct to standardise the services offered to temporary
migrants, foreign students, EU workers (with particular attention paid to
those coming from the new Member States), and other categories of
migrants who are typically excluded from integration strategies for political
reasons. The development of codes of conduct should build on the
European Handbook on Integration and the Common Basic Principles. The
proposed Integration Forum and the network of National Contact Points on
Integration are the ideal mechanisms for bringing together representatives at
the EU level. In turn, having a concrete programme of work would ensure
that the Integration Forum becomes more than just another talking shop.
5) The proposed Integration Fund should make local capacity-building in
Member States a priority, to ensure that introductory programmes and
language courses are made available to all newcomers. The capacity to
provide these services currently varies from state to state – for example,
countries with less experience of migration have fewer established 
networks – and there is a heavier burden on Member States with higher
annual inflows of foreign nationals. The availability of funding could be
linked to the willingness of applicants to implement the standards enshrined
in codes of conduct and the Common Basic Principles.
6) Training courses should be developed for employers, university staff, and
other providers of integration and introduction programmes to support new
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In the past few decades, migration to Europe has undergone a sea change in
its complexity and composition.
‘Migration’ is no longer seen as a once-only movement of people who
intend to settle in a new country. It now encompasses a much broader
concept of mobility, covering those who move countries for work, study,
social or humanitarian reasons.
Policies to manage these flows of people have also become more complex, and
there has been a proliferation of legal categories of migrants, each with a broad
range of rights and entitlements. Although most European countries recognise
how important integration policies are – and that they need to be designed in
concert with immigration policies – there is little sign that they are being
broadened to take account of the new realities created by international mobility.
This paper addresses three categories of international migrants who are
becoming more visible in Europe: temporary workers, international students
and those who move from the new EU-8 Member States to the older EU-15.
These three groups are vital for Europe’s continued economic success, but
their social needs have been largely overlooked.
Most integration strategies and introduction programmes are targeted at
people who arrive intending to settle permanently. Temporary workers,
students and EU workers have to depend on the enthusiasm and resources
of their local community – employers, universities or civil society
organisations – for an introduction into their host society and help in
integrating. When no such support is forthcoming, they risk becoming
socially excluded, are less able to defend their rights and are more
vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous employers.
Integration strategies should be targeted at all non-nationals, not just 
third-country nationals, and should begin on day one. They should
foster a functional level of integration so that all migrants have the
opportunity to become self-sufficient in their host society, regardless
of how long they intend to stay. They need introductory programmes
which include basic language tuition and practical information on public
services, the host culture and community structures, as well as advice on

















06 Since integration takes place on a number of levels and through a variety of
actors, these programmes should be implemented as flexibly as possible.
The European Commission is well placed to play an essential role, by
creating Europe-wide standards – or codes of conduct – for introductory
programmes for all new arrivals. These guidelines should ensure that
programmes to integrate non-nationals into Europe begin on the day they
arrive, regardless of how these programmes are organised or who carries
them out.
As well as encouraging labour migration to support Europe’s economic
needs, the European Year of Workers’ Mobility should also emphasise how
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